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Abstract
Context In Europe, policy measures are starting to
emerge that promote multifunctional farming systems
and delivery of ecosystem services besides food
production. Effectiveness of these policy instruments
have to deal with ecological, economic and social
complexities and with complexities in individual
decisions of local actors leading to system shifts.
Objective The objective of this paper is to discover
the most important social and/or economic drivers that
cause farm systems to shift between a monofunctional
(providing food) and a multifunctional state (provid-
ing food and natural pest regulation).
Methods Using a cellular automata model, we
simulated decisions of individual farmers to shift
between a mono-and multifunctional state through
time, based on their behaviour type and on financial
and social consequences. Collaboration of multifunc-
tional farmers at a landscape scale is a precondition to
provide a reliable level of natural pest regulation.
Results Costs of applying green infrastructure was
an important driver for the size and the conversion rate
of shifts between mono-and multifunctional farming
systems. Shifts towards multifunctional farming were
enhanced by a higher motivation of farmers to produce
sustainably, while shifts (back) to a monofunctional
state was enhanced by a low social cohesion between
multifunctional farmers.
Conclusions These results suggest that in order to
develop a multifunctional farming system, individual
farmers should act counterintuitively to their conven-
tional farming environment. To maintain a multifunc-
tional farming system, social cohesion between
multifunctional farmers is most relevant. Financial
aspects are important in both shifts.
Keywords Complex adaptive systems  Ecosystem
services  Farmer behaviour  Green infrastructure 
Hysteresis  Natural pest regulation
Introduction
Since several decades European policy instruments
like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have
been developed to stimulate individual farmers
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maximizing agricultural management towards food
production for the world market. Maximization of
food production, however, happened at the detriment
of other ecosystem services (MEA 2005; ten Brink
2009; Power 2010; Galic et al. 2011; Tayyebi et al.
2016), including regulating services like natural pest
regulation and water quality, cultural services like
aesthetic landscapes and services that support food
production like soil structure and fertility. Recently
awareness is growing that agricultural policy should
stimulate farmers to produce in a more sustainable
way, which means that food production should be
combined with delivering other ecosystem services,
for example those that contribute to ecological and
climate policy goals (Greening the CAP EC 2011). As
compared to multifunctional farm systems, single
target farming is considered to be less resilient to
(abrupt) changing social-economic conditions like
fluctuations in the market price or to ecological shocks
like weather extremes due to climate change (Wilson
2010; Schouten et al. 2012, 2013). Policy measures to
promote more sustainable and more resilient land use
systems are starting to emerge. These measures are
often based on stimulation mechanisms, such as agri-
environmental schemes or payments for ecosystem
services programs, rather than on restrictive
mechanisms.
Systems changing from single to multiple goal
farming encounter ecological, economic as well as
social complexity, because (agricultural) landscapes
and their people are heterogeneous and diverse in
geographical, ecological and social-cultural respect
(Mollinga 2010). For example, farming will be
influenced by the demand for ecosystem services,
fluctuations in the world market prices, the develop-
ment of regional certificates and by collaboration
between farmers. From an ecological point of view,
reliable delivery of ecosystem services like pollination
or natural pest regulation requires sufficient amount of
(semi) natural elements (green infrastructure) at a
landscape level (Ricketts et al. 2008; Steingro¨ver et al.
2010; Harrison et al. 2014). However, farmers decide
upon the management of their land individually, which
emphasizes the need to link farm-based decisions to
coordinated landscape level management (Opdam
et al. 2015). From an economic perspective, an
increase in (contract) payments increases the amount
of farmers incorporating agri-environmental contracts
into their decision making (Peerlings and Polman
2015), or other common benefits delivered by the
landscape. From a social perspective, farmers are
affected by the prevailing view on farming in their
social network (Jongeneel et al. 2008; Wilson 2008;
Seuneke 2014). Scholars have suggested that govern-
mental incentives such as agri-environmental pay-
ments may be made conditional on landscape level
collaboration (Prager et al. 2012). In the Netherlands
for example, only collectives of farmers will be able to
receive future payments for agri-environment
schemes. Thus, the effectiveness of policy instruments
depends on how they handle ecological, economic and
social complexities (Levin et al. 2013).
To develop a better understanding of the dynamics
of coupled human-landscape interactions, the con-
cepts of complex adaptive systems (CAS, Levin 1998)
and social-ecological systems (SES, Walker et al.
2004) have been advocated. These systems are
characterized by strong interdependencies between
ecological and social systems and on feed-back
systems between actors, institutions and resources,
both across several levels of spatial scale (Schlu¨ter
et al. 2012). Complex system theory learns that
interactions of different actors at the local level, in
interaction with their ecological and social network
context, may result in (non-linear) changes at the
system level (Schlu¨ter et al. 2012). In other words:
micro-scale events can result in macro-scale dynam-
ics. Computer simulation models are particularly
helpful to analyse how these landscape level patterns
emerge from micro-level events (An 2012; Levin et al.
2013). We argue that a CAS approach of socio-
ecological systems is applicable to farming systems, as
there are clear interdependencies between ecological
systems (resources needed for food production) and
social systems (farmers, market partners and govern-
ments). Also there are clear feedbacks between
decisions of individual farmers and food production,
while actions of individual farmers have implications
on the system level through ecological, economic and
political principles that operate on scale levels above
that of the individual farmer.
In this paper we focus on modelling decisions of
individual farmers and whether these decisions cause
agricultural land use systems to shift between a
monofunctional and a multifunctional state. Our
approach differs from previous methods to model
farm community dynamics using an ABM approach
(Brady et al. 2012; Schouten et al. 2013) in the
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combination of economic and social feed-back
between landscape level and farm level processes
and in the heterogeneity in farmer’s attitudes. In this
study we define monofunctional farming as arable
farms producing food for the world market with the
use of chemical pesticides, referred to as conventional
farms. In contrast, multifunctional farming is defined
as producing a certified product and using the potential
of the landscape to provide natural pest regulation by
investing in green infrastructure. The ecological
preconditions of effective natural pest regulation,
namely a network of green infrastructure on a
landscape scale, urges collaboration of farmers that
apply multifunctional farming. We study the devel-
opment of the number of mono- and multifunctional
farms in a virtual agricultural landscape, inspired by a
real world case study in the Netherlands (Steingro¨ver
et al. 2010). Following Basse et al. (2014), we apply
cellular automata for modelling dynamic processes of
land use systems and formalising them through a
bottom-up approach. With this study, we search for the
most important drivers that lead to a shift from
monofunctional to multifunctional farming and vice
versa, by means of a sensitivity analysis on the model.
In practice, the shift from multifunctional to mono-
functional farming is undesirable. By getting to know
the drivers, such a shift can be prevented.
We focus at the following question:
What are the most important social and/or eco-
nomic drivers determining the size and the conversion
rate of a farm system shift from a monofunctional to a
multifunctional state and vice versa, considering the
need to adjust the ecological conditions of natural pest
regulation by collaborative action at the landscape
level?
Methods
In this section we describe the model heterogeneous
utilization of land cellular automata (HULC). Also the
applied sensitivity analysis is described in this
section. For a complete description of the model,
including input parameter list and sub modes follow-
ing the overview, design concepts, and details (ODD)
protocol (Grimm et al. 2006; Grimm et al. 2010), see
appendix in electronic supplementary material. We
use a cellular automata tool, which is not explicitly
agent based. However, cellular automata models are
spatially explicit, cells can have multiple states and
can be influenced by neighbouring cells. In this model
approach only one type of agent is considered, where
each cell represents an individual farmer and its farm.
Model: heterogeneous utilization of land cellular
automata (HULC)
Each farmer is represented by a grid cell in the cellular
automata model (Barredo et al. 2003) of 400 grids and
all state variables are linked to this grid cell. A farm
represents a mean farm size of about 60 ha which is
about the average size of an arable farm in the
Netherlands. The behaviour of a farmer is defined by
income (income I), drive to produce sustainably (green
drive D) and drive to socially fit to multifunctional
neighbours (social pressure S) and by the (relative)
weight of the utility value they gain by these drivers.
The model is based on the concept of utility, but goes
beyond the financial-only interpretation of utility
(Murray-Rust et al. 2014). Here, it presents the extent
to which a parameter value fulfils a need or demand for
that parameter and enables the user to compare the
values of different parameters.
All model rules are evenly valid for all farmers. One
time tick represents a harvest cycle of one year and one
grid cell represents a farm. A farm state can either
monofunctional (CONV) or multifunctional (GI). At
initiation of each run, three types of farmer behaviour
are selected in which the fraction (indicating weight)
of I, D and S is randomly chosen. The distribution of
each of these farmer behaviour types over the grid is
also randomly chosen. For each run the fraction of I,
D and S in the whole grid is calculated. Each year a
farmer decides whether he will stay of become CONV
or GI. The state (CONV or GI) with the highest
expected total utility obtained from I, D and S in the
next year will be chosen. The model system is defined
to be multifunctional if beside food production also
natural pest regulation is provided by pest regulating
species feeding on or infesting pest species that
damage crops. To provide habitat for these regulating
species multifunctional farmers apply a network of
(semi)-natural habitat (flower strips, green infrastruc-
ture) on their farm. The reliability of natural pest
regulation increases as the percentage of GI farms in
the near surroundings is higher. Without sufficient
green infrastructure on a landscape scale, a sudden
increase of pest species can occur (pest outbreak)
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resulting in yield loss. Therefore, a cluster of multi-
functional farms at the landscape scale is needed to
build up a reliable level of natural pest regulation. In a
monofunctional system, pest outbreaks are prevented
by using pesticides. A system shift is assumed when a
stable state is reached with a different fraction of GI
farms than the initial state.
Income (ICONV, IGI) is defined by yield, costs and
prices. Costs and prices do not change during runs. For
CONV farmers yield (YCONV), costs of pesticides
(CCHEM) and market prices (PCONV) are standardized
to 1. For GI farmers yield (YGI) is similar to that on a
CONV farm, unless it is lowered by a pest outbreak
(YGI-pest). Probability of a pest outbreak decreases with
the number of surrounding GI farms following a
logistic (s-shaped) curve. This curve is determined by
fixed parameters of steepness, inflection point and
neighbourhood size, based on literature (Bianchi et al.
2006; Baveco and Bianchi 2008; Steingro¨ver et al.
2010; Harrison et al. 2014). Costs of applying GI (CGI)
can be lower or higher in relation to costs of CONV
farmers. Prices of certified GI farm products (PGI) are
similar or higher than that of CONV farms. Social
pressure (S) increases with the number of neighbour-
ing GI farms at the previous tick. S follows a logistic
curve, determined by steepness (steepS), inflection
point (IPS) and neighbourhood size (nbhS). Green
drive (D) is drawn from a normal distribution with
parameters alpha and beta at the beginning of each run
and will not change during the model runs. Higher
alpha/beta values lead to stronger skewness to the right
selecting relatively high values of green drive. The
relation between income, green drive, social pressure
and the utility value of these drivers varies from a
linear to logistic curve, depending on the shape
parameter.
Sensitivity analysis
Within the parameter space described for the input
parameter settings (see appendix in electronic supple-
mentary material) we selected 1000 parameter combi-
nations and ran each combination 15 times, implying
different settings of initial land use and a different set of
farmer behaviour types in the grid. All input param-
eters were tested, except price, costs and harvest yield
at conventional farms, these values are normalised at 1,
while equivalent parameters of GI farms were tested as
related to the CONV value 1. Also input parameters
determining pest probability were not tested. Only the
sensitivity of the model for harvest yield under a pest
outbreak (YGI-pest) was tested. Although farmers make
decisions individually, we analysed the process of
increase and decline of the percentage of GI farms at
the level of the model grid as a whole. Therefore, we
chose the percentage of GI farms as output parameter.
Spatial cohesion of GI farms was measured but not
used in the sensitivity analysis, as this output parameter
was highly correlated to the percentage of GI farms.
We let the model run until the year in which the
percentage of GI stabilized. Otherwise, we let the
model run for 25 ticks.
Since we want to explore what the preconditions are
to reach a system shift from a conventional agricul-
tural system to a multifunctional system and vice
versa, we first calculated the size of this system shift,
i.e. the difference between initial percentage of GI
farms and the percentage of GI farms after stabiliza-
tion of the model. This change can either be positive
(more multifunctional as more farmers apply GI), zero
or negative (more monofunctional as less farmers
apply GI). We devided our data into a set resulting in a
positive change in percentage of GI farms in the grid
representing a shift towards multifunctionality and a
set resulting in a negative change in percentage of GI
farms in the grid representing a shift towards mono-
functionality. We omit the preconditions that do not
lead to a change in percentage of GI farms. We are
interested in the change in percentage of GI farms as
output variable. To account for pseudo replication and
bias in coefficient estimates, we averaged the output
variable over the 15 replications. This average
percentage of GI farms was normally distributed over
the 15 replications. With the average percentage of GI
farms as dependent variable, we executed forward
stepwise linear regression analyses on both datasets to
find the most important parameters in determining
either a positive or a negative change in farmers
applying GI. This analysis was carried out in R (R
CORE TEAM 2012). By means of model fitting
through stepwise regression, we proportionally
assigned the output variance (Ten Broeke et al.
2016) and found the most important drivers in order
of additional value. In stepwise regression, variables
of preconditions are added or removed in a stepwise
manner until the model is not improved anymore. As
we only analyzed stabilizing runs, a system shift
should imply a new stable system.
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Second, we determined the year where the percent-
age of GI stabilizes as dependent variable, and
averaged this year over the 15 replications. If this
average year value is lower, the conversion rate is
higher. In this way we investigated which precondi-
tions determine the conversion rate of a system shift,
or in other words, whether a shift is more gradual or
fast (range 1 year ‘‘fast’’ to 25 years ‘‘gradual’’). For
this purpose, we again used forward stepwise linear
regressions on both datasets (positive or negative
change in percentage GI farms). Now we included
non-stabilizing runs, implying that with a gradual shift
the percentage of GI farms can still be increasing or
decreasing after 25 years.
Results
Parameters of final regression models that were
selected in forward stepwise linear regression analysis
are presented in Table 1 and 2. For each parameter the
estimated value, standard error of the estimate, fitted t
value and the probability that this value is exceeded is
presented for the final regression model. In forward
stepwise regression analysis, only the estimates of the
parameters added first in the total regression model are
similar to the single effects of these parameters.
Therefore only these parameters are discussed in
detail. The first section (with Table 1; Fig. 1) presents
selected model parameters affecting the size of a
system shift, i.e. parameters that result in, respectively,
a positive (Table 1a) and a negative (Table 1b) change
in percentage of GI farms. The second section (with
Table 2) presents selected model parameters affecting
the conversion rate of a system shift, represented by
the year at which the percentage of GI farms stabilizes
in respectively a positive (Table 2a) and a negative
(Table 2b) change in percentage of GI farms.
Important drivers of the size of system shifts
We found that the relative costs of applying green
infrastructure on a GI farm (relCGI), compared to the
costs of applying pesticides on a CONV farm, was the
most important driver of a shift towards a more
multifunctional state (Table 1a). The effect of costs on
a GI farm is negative, implying that fewer farmers are
triggered to apply GI on their farms when these costs
increase (Fig. 1a). The second important driver
towards a multifunctional system is a high fraction
Table 1 Results of sensitivity analysis where the independent
variable is determined as the size of (a) the positive change in
percentage of GI farms, averaged over the 15 replications
(more farmers shift from mono- to multifunctional farming
over the course of a run) and of (b) negative change in
percentage of GI farms, averaged over the 15 replications
(more farmers shift from multi- to monofunctional farming
over the course of a run), excluding runs that do not stabilize
Coefficients Estimate SE t value Pr([|t|)
a (n = 385) Size of shift towards GI
Intercept 40.0684 4.5431 8.820 \2e-16
CrelGI Costs of applying GI in comparison with costs of pesticides -3.9154 1.0935 -3.580 0.0004
fD/fS Fraction green drive/social pressure in grid 1.5253 0.5008 3.046 0.0025
YGI-pest Remaining GI Yield at pest outbreak 13.0704 5.0417 2.592 0.0099
IPS Inflection point social pressure curve -8.7114 5.9929 -1.454 0.1469
b (n = 640) Size of shift towards CONV
Intercept -27.5056 5.7094 -4.818 1.8e-06
IPS Inflection point social pressure curve -12.9242 4.1166 -3.140 0.0018
CrelGI Costs of GI relative to CONV -1.9625 0.9096 -2.158 0.0313
nbhS Neighbourhood size social pressure -1.5299 0.8151 -1.877 0.0610
beta Beta parameter normal distribution green drive -0.0781 0.0426 -1.834 0.0672
PGI Price GI crop 1.4868 1.0207 1.457 0.1457
For each parameter the estimated value, standard error of the estimate, fitted t value and the probability that this value is exceeded is
presented for the final regression model
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of farmers with a green drive in the grid of 400
farmers, in relation to the fraction of farmers driven by
social pressure (fD/fS). The third important driver
causing a conversion towards multifunctional farming
was a high remaining yield during pest outbreaks for
all GI farmers (YGI-pest).
For a farming system to shift towards a more
monofunctional state, social pressure is the most
important driver, to be precise the inflection point of
the s-curve of social pressure versus number of GI
neighbours (IPS, Table 1b). This parameter refects
how sensitive farmers are for the social pressure of
their (GI) neighbours and has a negative effect on the
multifunctionality of the system: if the inflection point
is low, farmers already experience a high pressure to
apply GI if only few neighbouring farmers also apply
GI. If the inflection point is high, farmers only
experience a high pressure to apply GI if the majority
of the neighbouring farmers also apply GI. Conse-
quently at increasing inflection point more multifunc-
tional farmers switch to conventional farming and the
percentage of GI farms decreases (Fig. 1b). The
second selected driver is relative costs of applying
GI (relCGI), having a negative effect on the multi-
functionality of the system: at increasing costs of
applying GI more GI farms switch back to CONV
farms. The third selected parameter is the size of the
neighbourhood of which farmers experience social
pressure (nbhS), also with a negative effect on
multifunctionality: when neighbourhood size is large,
a large part of all farmers in the grid are considered in
determining how many GI neighbours convince a
farmer to do the same. As a predominantly GI playing
field is not likely to occur, it is more probable that the
system will change towards a monofunctional state at
a higher neighbourhood size.
Important drivers of the conversion rate of system
shifts
A conversion to a more multifunctional system was
most strongly accelerated by higher remaining yields
in case of a pest outbreak (YGI-pest, Table 2a), leading
to a lower stabilization year. Second, higher costs of
applying GI (CrelGI) slows down the conversion
bFig. 1 a The change in percentage of GI farms versus relative
costs of applying GI on GI farms. Costs of applying GI are
expressed in comparison to costs of applying pesticides at
CONV farms (CrelGI). If the relative costs of applying GI
increases, less farmers shift to multifunctional farming, leading
to a lower percentage of GI farms in the whole grid of 400 farms.
White dots represent median y-values (% GI farms) at that
x-value (CrelG), bold bars the middle interquartile (50%) range
of values and the width of the violin plot represents the
probability density of values. The single effects of the parameter
in the sensitivity analysis are shown. All replications are
included.b The change in percentage of GI farms versus
inflection point of the curve of social pressure versus number
of GI neighbours. At increasing inflection point farmers are less
sensitive to the behaviour of their neighbour GI farmers, leading
to, more farmers shifting to conventional farming and conse-
quently to a lower percentage of GI farms in the whole grid of
400 farms.White dots represent median y-values (% GI farms) at
that x-value (IPS), bold bars the middle interquartile (50%)
range of values and the width of the violin plot represents the
probability density of values. The single effects of the parameter
in the sensitivity analysis are shown. All replications are
included
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towards multifunctional farming. Third, a higher price
for GI crops (PGI) accelerates the conversion to a more
multifunctional system.
For the rate of conversion towards a more conven-
tional system, social pressure is the most important
driver, again the inflection point of the s-curve of
social pressure versus number of GI neighbours (IPS,
Table 2b). At high values of IPS farmers experience a
low social pressure to apply GI unless the majority of
the neighbour farmers already apply GI. Consequently
at higher inflection point GI farms switch to conven-
tional farming sooner in the runtime of the model (at
lower stabilization year). The second selected driver
towards a more conventional system is green drive, to
be precise the alpha value of the normal distribution
from which the value of green drive of each individual
farmer is randomly selected. A higher alpha slows
down the shift towards conventional farming (higher
stabilization tick). Thirdly, higher costs of applying GI
(CrelGI) accelerates the conversion towards a CONV
system.
In general, all model runs stabilize very quickly,
implying that 78% of all runs stabilize within 5 ticks,
while only 3% of all runs does nog stabilize at all of
only after 25 ticks (Fig. 2).
Discussion
In this paper we identified social and economic
conditions that cause shifts in a agricultural socio-
ecological system between monofunctional (conven-
tional) farming and multifunctional (applying green
Fig. 2 Frequency diagram of stabilization year (stabilization
tick) of all model runs. All replications are included
Table 2 Results of sensitivity analysis where the independent
variable is determined as the conversion rate of (a) the positive
change in percentage of GI farms, averaged over the 15
replications (more farmers shift from mono- to multifunctional
farming over the course of a run) and of (b) negative change in
percentage of GI farms, averaged over the 15 replications
(more farmers shift from multi- to monofunctional farming
over the course of a run), including runs that do not stabilize
Coefficients Estimate SE t value Pr([|t|)
a (n = 395) Conversion rate of shift towards GI
Intercept 12.1522 1.1487 10.579 \2e-16
YGI-pest Remaining GI Yield at pest outbreak -4.8962 0.9806 -4.993 8.99e–07
CrelGI Costs of GI relative to CONV 1.2692 0.2089 6.075 2.95e–09
PGI Price GI crop -0.9349 0.2555 -3.659 0.0003
nbhS Neighbourhood size social pressure -0.7017 0.1986 -3.534 0.0005
fI / fS Fraction income/social pressure in grid -0.0124 0.0087 -1.421 0.1561
b (n = 641) Conversion rate of shift towards CONV
Intercept 5.7071 0.8734 6.535 1.31e-10
IPS Inflection point social pressure curve -2.8321 0.5812 -4.873 1.39e-06
alpha Alpha parameter normal distribution green drive 0.0183 0.0058 3.182 0.0015
CrelGI Costs of GI relative to CONV -0.3572 0.1298 -2.751 0.0061
PGI Price GI crop 0.38788 0.1463 2.651 0.0082
steepS Steepness social pressure curve 0.2689 0.1251 2.149 0.0320
fI / fD Fraction income/green drive in grid -0.0470 0.0218 -2.154 0.0316
YGI-pest GI Yield at pest outbreak -1.0329 0.5813 -1.777 0.0760
nbhS Neighbourhood size social pressure -0.1996 0.1155 -1.728 0.0845
For each parameter the estimated value, standard error of the estimate, fitted t value and the probability that this value is exceeded is
presented for the final regression model
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infrastructure for natural pest regulation). Also we
identified conditions that affect the conversion rate of
a system shift.
Dominant drivers of a system shift from mono-
functional towards multifunctional systems appeared
to be different from drivers to a system shift in the
opposite direction: for shifts towards multifunctional
farming green drive of a farmer is more important than
his sensitivity for social pressure from other farmers,
while for shifts towards monofunctional farming
social pressure is more important than green drive.
Finaly a high remaining yield in case of pest outbreaks
is important for a shift towards multifunctional
farming (Fig. 3). Economic drivers, however, are
important drivers irrespective of the direction of the
shift: low costs stimulate a shift towards multifunc-
tional farming while high costs stimulate a shift back
to conventional farming.
This would suggest that in order to develop a
multifunctional farming system, individual farmers
with a natural drive for multifunctional farming and
acting contra dictionary to their monofunctional
farming environment are important. In order to
maintain a multifunctional farming system, it is most
important to keep investing in social cohesion between
multifunctional farmers. In both developing and
maintaining multifunctional farming, the costs of
investments in green infrastructure have to be
compensated by higher product prices, compensating
payments or alternative income.
Perspectives from agricultural studies
Green infrastructure networks can be effective in pest
regulation, as is illustrated by Van Alebeek et al.
(2006), who found that aphid infestation of summer
wheat is 15–65% higher in absence of these networks.
The decrease in yield due to pest outbreaks appeared to
be an important driver of shifts towards multifunc-
tional farming. Although many (review) studies
observed a positive relation between green infrastruc-
ture and pest pressure or pest regulating species
(Bianchi et al. 2006; Van Alebeek et al. 2006;
Cardinale et al. 2012; Harrison et al. 2014), little is
known about the resulting decrease in yield. O¨stman
et al. (2003) found that green infrastructure networks
resulted into a reduction in yield loss up to 52% in
Sweden, where cereal yield losses of 15% can occur.
Moreover, natural enemies in green infrastructure
reduce the peak of aphid densities during pest
outbreaks. This also reduces the amount of pesticides
needed to control these outbreaks. However, natural
enemies are reduced by preventive use of pesticides,
as is common practice in the Netherlands and is
applied to conventional farmers in our model. Preven-
tive use of pesticides also prevents free riding by
Fig. 3 Most important
drivers for shifts towards
farming applying green
infrastructure supporting
natural pest regulation (GI)





hysteresis: the system reacts
differently on drivers when
the direction of the shift is
different
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conventional farmers by using natural pest regulation
from surrounding multifunctional farms (Cong et al.
2014). Multifunctional farmers in the model do not use
pesticides at all. In practice, these farmers often spray
when they think it is necessary. A non-spraying
multifunctional farmer without sufficient green infras-
tructure on his own farm and surrounding farms will
not be sufficiently protected against pest outbreaks. In
our model, farmers can switch between applying GI
and removing them, while in practice it may take time
before pest regulating insects colonize (perennial)
green infrastructure. We did not include effects of
existing woody and grassy green infrastructure in our
model, but these are, beside flower strips, also
important to natural pest regulation as they deliver
hibernation sites or alternative food source for pest
regulating insects (Bianchi and van der Werf 2003;
Thies et al. 2003; van Rijn 2014). Evaluations of the
value of natural enemies in monetary terms for
individual farmers are rare, while individual farmers
decide on insecticide use (O¨stman et al. 2003). From
KWIN data and compensation payments for agricul-
tural nature management (KWIN-AGV database
2012, unpublished) we estimated that in the Nether-
lands the costs of applying GI is about twice as high as
costs of applying pesticides. However, when calculat-
ing costs of applying pesticides, costs of negative side
effects as water pollution and decreasing functional
biodiversity (Geiger et al. 2010) for pest regulation
and pollination, are not included. Ecological intensi-
fication, as suggested by Bommarco et al. (2011) is a
way to intensify crop production while minimizing
negative impacts on the environment, by making
optimal use of ecosystem services provided by biodi-
versity and green infrastructure. In the current model
multifunctional farming is represented by one ecosys-
tem service (natural pest regulation). However, farm-
ers may accumulate income or direct value of several
other ecosystem services, for instance by deriving
subsidies for agricultural nature management or water
purification, or gain extra value of pollination,
increased organic matter, biomass production or
recreational provisions.
In our model, farmers weigh social feed-back from
decisions from surrounding farmers (see also Murray-
Rust et al. 2014). We created a social interdependency
between the individual farm scale and the landscape
scale by assuming that farmers are aware of the fact
that, for creating a natural pest regulation potential on
their farm, they need to cooperate at the level of the
landscape. Our results suggest that green drive is
relatively important compared to social pressure in
shifts towards multifunctional farming, while social
pressure is relatively more important to prevent
multifunctional systems to shift back to monofunc-
tional systems. Findings of Seuneke (2014), based on
interviewing Dutch farmers, support our results. While
conventional farmers learn from close-by traditional
agricultural knowledge institutions such as farmers’
unions and the government (bonding social capital),
multifunctional farmers lead their own learning pro-
cess. They have to leave the farm and their conven-
tional learning environment to develop a new social
network (bridging social capital), consisting mostly of
weaker and more heterogeneous ties, to learn a new
form of entrepreneurship. This behaviour is reflected
by our model farmers with a high green drive, that
decide to switch to GI farming irrespective of their
CONV neighbour farmers. Social parameters (al-
pha/beta green drive curve, steepness/inflection point
and neighbourhood social pressure, farmer types) are
difficult to parametrise or validate in the field.
Although the applied HULC model may therefore be
less suited for testing specific land-use changes
(Acosta et al. 2014), it gives insight in underlying
processes in agricultural systems.
Perspectives from system analysis studies
The fact that the dominant drivers of a system shift
from monofunctional towards multifunctional systems
are different from drivers to a system shift in the
opposite direction indicates hysteresis: the future
output depends on the history or starting point. In
our model farm system, monofunctional farmers
dominate the starting point of a shift towards multi-
functional farming. These farmers lack GI networks
and give social pressure towards monofunctional
farming. However, at a shift towards monofunctional
farming, the landscape is dominated by multifunc-
tional farmers. These farmers benefit from the built-up
GI networks and exert social pressure towards a
multifunctional state. These different starting points
may explain the different drivers of shifts in opposite
directions. Similar effects were found in other eco-
logical and social systems (Scheffer et al. 2001).
Parameters like social pressure and pest probability
were assumed to have a non-linear relation with the
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number of multifunctional farmers. Hysteresis is often
caused by these nonlinear relations (Levin et al. 2013).
System shifts may be gradual or with critical transi-
tions, the latter happening in homogenous and well
connected networks (Scheffer et al. 2012), in which
case shifts may be more difficult to reverse (Scheffer
et al. 2009; Levin et al. 2013). Seventy-eight percent
of the conversions between mono- and multifunctional
farming in our model runs happen fast. It is difficult to
say if conversion rate per se´ indicates the occurrence
of tipping points. The high conversion rate of most of
our model runs could also be caused by the stable en-
vironment of the model runs, where stress factors
(prices, costs) and farmer behaviour types do not
fluctuate during the runtime. In this stable environ-
ment, most shift events stabilized within 25 time steps
(years). In the future it may be interesting to analyse
fluctuations between start and final situation during
changing conditions, as fluctuations may indicate
tipping points (Scheffer et al. 2012; Dakos et al. 2013),
just as the speed of shifts may indicate tipping points.
The landscape in the HULC model is only explicit
and heterogeneous in the sense that the position of
each mono- and multifunctional farmer is known
during the runs. Each GI farmer is assumed to apply
green infrastructure in a sufficient way to deliver
natural pest regulation, but the area, age, location and
quality of flower strips are not modeled. Natural
elements also support several other ecosystems ser-
vices producing extra value for multifunctional farm-
ers (like pollination) or for other agents like nature
organisations, tourists and water boards (nature,
recreation and water regulation). Finding synergy
between several ecosystem services and their corre-
sponding agents or actors in agricultural landscapes
may deliver the financial and social support farmers
need to make the shift to multifunctional farming
resilient and sustainable. Adding explicit landscapes
features may reveal the role of landscape character-
istics on systems shift but also increases the complex-
ity of the model considerably and may limit the
provenance of the model (Bennet et al. 2011).
Relevance for policy and science
(Agricultural) ecosystem management should be flex-
ible and capable of dealing with different scales and
hierarchies, uncertainties, new challenges and views
from different perspectives (Cary 1998; Rammel et al.
2007). Therefore, our understanding of social-ecolog-
ical complexity of agricultural systems should be
improved. This is needed to provide policy makers
(CAP, farmer collectives) with better indications of
important incentives to stimulate both the develop-
ment and the continuation of multifunctional farming
(Cormont et al. 2012). To achieve this, two major lines
of development in modelling are needed to our
opinion: understanding the role of stress by fluctuating
conditions and the role of the learning capacity of
farmers.
The HULC model was tested in a stable environ-
ment, where no stress factors like fluctuating condi-
tions (e.g. in price or yield) were taken into account.
Running the model in an unstable environment may
reveal what impact fluctuating market prices, yields,
pest outbreaks and changes in subsidy regulations or
CAP reforms have on the decisions made by individ-
ual farmers and on the agricultural system as a whole.
This may lead to more fluctuations between mono- and
multifunctional systems and may give new insights in
the adaptive capacity of both systems.
From a sociological perspective, adaptive capacity
has been related to the capacity to learn, to cooperate,
to use knowledge and to self-organize (Folke et al.
2005; Armitage et al. 2009) and to the structure of the
social network (Janssen et al. 2006; Bodin and Crona
2009; Newig and Fritsch 2009; Crona and Hubacek
2010). However, in our model farmers do not learn
from results of previous years or from their neigh-
bours. Farmers learn indirectly from their neighbour-
ing farmer through the parameter social pressure,
reflecting a network of farmers that influence each
other. Therefore, implementing adaptation to chang-
ing conditions (stress) requires actual learning beha-
viour. Learning (by imitation behaviour or through
adaptive expectations) may be more realistic (Levin
et al. 2013; Meyfroid 2013) than using the current
static definition of social pressure. If implementation
of learning farmers in an environment with stress
factors in the model leads to a higher percentage of GI
farms, this would support the hypothesis that GI
farming is more resilient. Moreover, it is interesting to
assess what conditions are needed to develop a
sustainable social network of farmers in multifunc-
tional farming, as these networks do not arise through
conventional institutes like knowledge institutes and
farmers’ unions (Seuneke 2014) and because learning
has to be facilitated (Moschitz et al. 2015). What is for
604 Landscape Ecol (2017) 32:595–607
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instance the relative importance of leadership, agri-
cultural nature organisations, collectives or contacts
with non-farming stakeholders on the resilience of
multifunctional farming systems? These insights may
be useful in the light of the developments of greening
the CAP in the EU.
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